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Introduction 
This court should reverse Mr. Zaragoza's conviction and remand for a new trial on 
two grounds: (i) violation of the confrontation clauses and (ii) the refusal to give a lesser-
included instruction concerning aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. 
First, the conviction is based upon inadmissible hearsay statements the admission 
of which violated Mr. Zaragoza's confrontation rights. The trial court admitted the 
hearsay on the ground that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his confrontation rights. In making its 
forfeiture ruling, the trial court disregarded the fact that Mrs. Zaragoza (the witness 
whose hearsay was admitted) consulted independent counsel prior to her invoking the 
spousal privilege not to testify, concluding instead that "[t]he fact that [Mrs. Zaragoza] is 
unavailable is what is the important point here." (R. 47, 272:102.) 
In defending the trial court's ruling, the State suggests the Utah Supreme Court 
has adopted a minimal standard for wrongdoing, where rights are forfeited based on 
"pressure, manipulation, and threats." (Resp.Br. 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).) 
What the State fails to appreciate is that the trial court rejected a legal standard that would 
have required a finding of pressure, manipulation, and threats, leaving no basis for the 
State's argument. The State also contends that Mr. Zaragoza cured the confrontation 
clause violation when he called his wife as a witness. (Id. 34-35.) But the U.S. Supreme 
Court recently rejected that position, again leaving no basis for the State's argument. 
Second, the jury should have been instructed on the relationship between 
aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. The jury heard varying accounts of 
whether Mrs. Zaragoza was detained for a substantial period of time after the alleged 
assault. Two witnesses testified that there was no detention. Mrs. Zaragoza testified that 
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she was never restrained, locked in the room, or threatened if she tried to leave. (R. 
251:197-98.) That account is consistent with what she was said to have told Officer 
Smalley after the incident: "[o]nce [Mr. Zaragoza] had stopped hitting her . . . he left the 
room." (R. 251:70.) In light of that evidence, the jury had reason to believe that 
Mr. Zaragoza committed aggravated assault but that his conduct did not satisfy the 
detention element of aggravated kidnapping. Mr. Zaragoza requested a jury instruction 
that would have informed the jury of the relationship between those two offenses, but the 
trial court did not give that instruction. (R. 252:219.) 
In response, the State assumes that Mr. Zaragoza advances a merger argument, 
rather than a lesser-included-offense argument, and therefore responds to a claim that is 
not at issue. That leaves the merits of the lesser-included-offense argument unopposed. 
Otherwise, the State makes little effort to respond to the merits of the issues in the 
opening brief, instead focusing on preservation, marshaling, and the adequacy of briefing. 
The court should reject those challenges. As to preservation, the State acknowledges that 
the instruction Mr. Zaragoza says should have been given was, in fact, the instruction he 
requested in the trial court. (Resp.Br. 13.) As to marshaling, the trial court never entered 
any findings of fact that could trigger a marshaling obligation. (R. 156.) As to 
inadequate briefing, the State contends that the opening brief fails to direct the court to 
the trial court's forfeiture ruling. (Resp.Br. 37.) But both the opening brief and response 
brief direct the court to the same oral ruling on forfeiture, which is all there is since the 
trial court never entered findings of fact or a written order on the forfeiture issue. 
2 
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In short, this court should decline the State's invitation to avoid the merits of this 
appeal, merits that are virtually unopposed by the State in the response brief. This court 
should reverse Mr. Zaragoza's conviction and remand for a new trial. 
Argument 
This court should reverse for two reasons. First, the trial court refused to instruct 
the jury on the lesser-included relationship of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated 
assault. Where two offenses overlap, and the evidence creates a rational basis for the jury 
to conclude the defendant committed the lesser offense, the court must give an instruction 
that explains the relationship between the offenses if the defendant requests one. Here, 
there was overlap because aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping are identical 
except that aggravated kidnapping requires detention. And the evidence on detention was 
sparse, providing the jury a rational basis to convict of aggravated assault only. The State 
barely addresses that argument, instead asserting the issue was not preserved and that any 
error was not plain. Because the issue was preserved, this court should reverse. 
Second, the trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his 
confrontation rights when Mrs. Zaragoza exercised her spousal privilege. A defendant 
must engage in wrongdoing to forfeit confrontation rights, but Mr. Zaragoza's conduct 
did not constitute wrongdoing. He spoke with his wife over the telephone to discuss their 
relationship in light of his case. He informed her of her constitutional privilege not to 
testify against him. Then, with the assistance of independent counsel, Mrs. Zaragoza 
elected not to testify. Deeming Mr. Zaragoza's conduct wrongful without finding that he 
procured Mrs. Zaragoza's absence through "pressure, manipulation, and threats," relaxes 
the standard for forfeiture beyond what the federal and state constitutions will allow. A 
3 
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review of the trial court's ruling reveals that the State is simply mistaken that the court 
found "pressure, manipulation, and threats" in this case, leaving the State's argument 
without any factual basis. (Resp.Br. 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).) 
In this reply, Mr. Zaragoza first will address the jury instruction issue and then 
will address the trial court's forfeiture ruling and the reasons why Mr. and Mrs. 
Zaragoza's phone conversations do not constitute wrongdoing sufficient for forfeiture of 
constitutional rights. Finally, Mr. Zaragoza will address the State's numerous 
contentions that this court should avoid deciding the merits of his claims. 
I. Mr. Zaragoza Was Entitled to a Jury Instruction Explaining the Relationship 
Between Aggravated Kidnapping and Aggravated Assault in this Case 
The trial court should have given Mr. Zaragoza's requested instruction on the 
relationship between the charges of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. As a 
matter of due process, a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction, if 
he requests it and if the evidence at trial and the relationship between the offenses 
warrants it. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157-59 (Utah 1983). The purpose for such an 
instruction is to permit the jury to convict on "any offense that fits the facts proved at 
trial, rather than forcing it to elect between the charges the prosecutor chooses to file and 
an acquittal." State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424-25 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion). 
The rule reflects the reality that a jury given the all-or-nothing choice between conviction 
and acquittal is likely to choose conviction where the prosecution has proved some 
offense, though not the one it charged. Baker, 671 P.2d at 157 ("'To expect a jury to . . . 
find a defendant innocent and thereby set him free when the evidence establishes beyond 
doubt that he is guilty of some violent crime requires of our juries clinical detachment 
4 
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from the reality of human experience.'" (quoting Beck v. Alabama. 441 U.S. 625, 642 
(1980))).1 If the defendant elects to minimize that risk by instructing the jury that it may 
choose to convict, not of the charged offense, but of a lesser offense that fits the facts, the 
court must give the instruction. Id. 
A lesser-included-offense instruction must be given when (i) there is "some 
overlap" in the elements of two crimes and (ii) the evidence provides a rational basis for 
the jury to acquit on the greater offense and convict of the lesser offense. Id. at 158-59. 
In Utah, the elements of assault and aggravated kidnapping share the necessary overlap. 
State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 589-90 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) ("[T]he offenses must be 
related in some way; there must be some overlap in the definitions of the two crimes, 
even though they need not meet the totally "included" standard." (emphasis added)). 
That standard was satisfied here. Relevant to this case, kidnapping is an unlawful 
substantial detention of a person against that person's will or a detention exposing the 
person to risk of bodily injury. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301(1). Kidnapping is 
aggravated under two circumstances related to aggravated assault: where the actor (i) 
possesses or uses a dangerous weapon; or (ii) acts with intent to inflict bodily injury 
on . . . the victim. Id. § 76-5-302(1 )(a) & -302(1 )(b)(iii). Those two aggravators track 
the State's theories for aggravated assault: (i) assault with a dangerous weapon not 
1
 See also Baker, 671 P.2d at 156-57 ("True, if the prosecution has not established 
beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged . . . the jury must, as a 
theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant is entitled to a lesser 
offense instruction-in this context or any other-precisely because he should not be 
exposed to the substantial risk that the jury?s practice will diverge from theory. Where 
one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly 
guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction." 
(quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973))). 
5 
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causing serious bodily injury; or (ii) assault causing serious bodily injury. Id. § 76-5-
103(l)(a) & -103(2)(b); (R. 178, 183.). Aggravated assault is a lesser-included offense of 
aggravated kidnapping because aggravated assault, if accompanied by a detention, can 
support a conviction of aggravated kidnapping. This is more than merely some overlap, 
which is all that need exist before a jury instruction is required. State v. Spillers, 2005 
UTApp 283,1J15, 116P.3d985. 
As to the detention element, the evidence gave the jurors reason to convict only on 
aggravated assault. In evaluating the evidence, this court views the facts and inferences 
in the light most favorable to the defendant. Id. If 13. Here, a State's witness, Officer 
Smalley, testified that Mr. Zaragoza left Mrs. Zaragoza alone in the hotel room "[o]nce 
he had stopped hitting her," at which point "he left the room." (R. 251:70.) When Mr. 
Zaragoza returned, Mrs. Zaragoza "determined that she did need to call the police and . . . 
was able to call 911." (Id.) That is consistent with Mrs. Zaragoza's testimony that she 
was not locked in the room, threatened with harm if she attempted to leave, or physically 
restrained. (R. 251:197-98.) That testimony gave the jury a rational basis to doubt the 
detention element and to convict Mr. Zaragoza of aggravated assault instead of 
aggravated kidnapping. The jury should have been, but was not, instructed that it could 
convict of aggravated assault as an alternative to aggravated kidnapping. 
In its response, the State largely does not address that argument, though the State 
does argue the error was harmless because the jury was instructed on aggravated assault 
and kidnapping, even if it was not told that the law permitted it to choose between the 
two. (Resp.Br. 15.) That reasoning disregards the basis for giving lesser-included-
offense instructions: when an inappropriate all-or-nothing choice is given, it is no answer 
6 
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to say that the jury selected 'all' instead of 'nothing.' Perhaps recognizing as much, the 
State claims that no special instruction was needed because the jury had an implicit 
choice between the two offenses. (Id.) In fact, the instructions implied the opposite. 
They expressly informed the jury that it could choose between two degrees of aggravated 
assault, but did not provide a similar choice between aggravated assault and aggravated 
kidnapping.2 (R. 183.) Rather than informing the jury of the "option of acquitting 
Defendant of aggravated kidnapping and convicting him only of aggravated assault," the 
instructions impliedly foreclosed that choice. (Resp.Br. 15.). 
The State then responds to a merger argument Mr. Zaragoza does not make in the 
opening brief. (Id. 15-19.) Offenses merge when, under the facts of the case, the 
defendant could not possibly have committed the lesser offense separately from also 
committing the greater offense. State v. Finlavson, 956 P.2d 283, 287-88 (Utah 1998). 
In those circumstances, only the conviction of the greater offense can be sustained. Id. at 
288. Though the doctrines are related such that analysis of one issue bears on the other,3 
jury instructions related to lesser-included offenses should be offered even if the offenses 
do not merge. State v. Lopez, 2004 UT App 410, | 9 , 103 P.3d 153. Where, as here, two 
overlapping offenses were sent to the jury, the jury should have been instructed on its 
2
 There was a lesser-included-offense issue with respect to the aggravated assault charges 
because of the factual issues regarding the extent of Mrs. Zaragoza's injuries. 
3
 Both doctrines consider the similarity in the elements of crimes and potential for double 
punishment. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) ("A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense."); State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, f32, 128 P.3d 1179 ("If one 
conviction is a lesser included offense of another conviction . . . the convictions merge."); 
Finlayson, 956 P.2d at 287-88 (to determine merger, the court may compare the statutory 
elements or "consider the evidence to determine whether the greater-lesser relationship 
exists between the specific variations of the crimes actually proved at trial"). 
7 
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ability to choose between the offenses if it doubted the State's evidence with respect to 
the greater charge. 
Though Mr. Zaragoza explained in his opening brief that he does not argue merger 
on appeal, the State nonetheless addresses merger. (Op.Br. 17 & n.5; Resp.Br. 15-19.) 
In addressing a merger argument that was not made, the State argues that the proposed 
instruction was properly denied because only the court should decide merger, and only 
after the verdict. "Otherwise," the State argues, "the court 'would deprive the jury of a 
legitimate option and create a new danger' in that the jury 'would not have the choice to 
convict on the [lesser] charge and acquit on the [greater].'" (Resp.Br. 18 (quoting Lopez, 
2004 UTApp 410, T|9).) 
That argument reinforces the need to send the lesser-included-offense issue to the 
jury in this case. The case on which the State relies, State v. Lopez, addressed whether a 
court errs when it rules on merger prior to instructing the jury on the lesser-included 
relationship between charged offenses. Lopez, 2004 UT App 410, ffifl-2. A premature 
ruling on merger there would have precluded the jury examining the lesser-included 
relationship between murder and kidnapping because the merger ruling would have 
resulted in only the murder charge being sent to the jury. Id. [^9. The Lopez court 
concluded that merger should be decided after the jury has already returned convictions, 
to preserve the jury's "choice to convict on the [lesser] charge and acquit on the [greater] 
charge." Id. That is, even when apparent that two offenses will merge, the court should 
give a lesser-included instruction to allow the jury to return a verdict on the lesser charge. 
That choice is important for the other reasons discussed above: it advances the 
policy of ensuring that jury verdicts conform to the facts of the case and it avoids the 
8 
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impermissible risk that a jury presented with the choice between aggravated kidnapping 
and nothing will choose aggravated kidnapping even if the State has, in fact, proven 
aggravated assault instead. Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424-25; Baker, 671 P.2d at 156-57. The 
State's merger argument demonstrates the lesser-included-offense issue should have been 
sent to the jury. Mr. Zaragoza was deprived of the protections required when lesser-
included offenses are at issue and his sentence should, therefore, be reversed. Mr. 
Zaragoza will next turn to the trial court's erroneous forfeiture ruling. 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That Mr. Zaragoza Forfeited His 
Confrontation Rights 
The trial court's forfeiture ruling does not satisfy constitutional standards. In State 
v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, |17, 232 P.3d 519, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the forfeiture 
by wrongdoing doctrine. Under that doctrine, a defendant may forfeit his confrontation 
right if he intentionally procures a witness's absence at trial through "wrongdoing." Id. 
The court in Poole was faced with a defendant who "'worked in conjunction with his 
wife' to 'pressure,' 'manipulate,' and 'threaten,'" a witness into refusing to testify against 
him. Id. Tf6. The State argues that Poole requires this court to uphold the forfeiture ruling 
because "that case did not involve violence or murder but, rather, 'pressure,' 
'manipulation],' and 'threats.'" (Resp.Br. 42 (quoting Poole, 2010 UT 25, |6).) If the 
State's reading of Poole is correct, the trial court did not apply the proper legal standard 
because it did not find that Mr. Zaragoza used threats, pressure, and manipulation to 
procure Mrs. Zaragoza's unavailability. Under the State's reading of Poole, the absence 
of any finding of threats is determinative of the issue here. Further, the State's arguments 
9 
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regarding Poole do not address the need for a unique forfeiture inquiry where a claim of 
spousal privilege is asserted. 
Beyond arguing that the Poole court opted for a relaxed forfeiture standard, the 
State also argues that the confrontation clause violation in this case was cured when Mrs. 
Zaragoza testified as a witness for the defense. As discussed here, that argument is 
incompatible with United States Supreme Court precedent. Mr. Zaragoza will respond to 
the State's arguments as follows: (i) the trial court's forfeiture decision does not comport 
with Poole and does not reflect the role of Utah's constitutional spousal privilege; and (ii) 
Mrs. Zaragoza's election to testify did not cure the constitutional violation, it shifted to 
Mr. Zaragoza the burden to produce evidence that should have rested on the State. 
A. The Trial Court's Forfeiture Ruling Fails to Satisfy the Standard 
Established in Poole and Fails to Accommodate the Role of Utah's 
Constitutional Spousal Testimonial Privilege 
Mr. Zaragoza's conduct was not wrongful within the meaning of Poole, especially 
in light of the spousal privilege at issue in this case. Here, Mr. Zaragoza will first 
discuss the State's interpretation of Poole and will then address the need for a specialized 
inquiry when a claim of spousal privilege is at issue. 
First, the State argues that Poole would permit a finding of forfeiture had the trial 
court found pressure, manipulation, and threats. If the State is correct about that, Mr. 
Zaragoza's conviction should be reversed because the trial court did not find that Mr. 
Zaragoza threatened Mrs. Zaragoza.4 Rather, the court employed a legal standard under 
which it concluded it need not find threats or manipulation. Though the court initially 
Counsel for Mr. Zaragoza attempted to call Mrs. Zaragoza during the forfeiture hearing 
to testify regarding whether she had ever been threatened but the trial court would not 
permit Mr. Zaragoza to "[have] it both ways." (R. 272:28). 
10 
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indicated that the State must prove that Mr. Zaragoza engaged in "threatening behavior" 
or the "wrongful intent to pressure," in order to justify forfeiture, the court later "changed 
[its] mind." (R. 272:11, 101-02.) The court then applied a standard for wrongdoing that 
is coextensive with "instances of witness tampering," and concluded that that standard 
was satisfied. (R. 272:103.) The basis for that conclusion was that, in several phone calls 
between Mr. and Mrs. Zaragoza, they had discussed their relationship in light of his 
offense and his upcoming trial. In the court's words, those calls contained "plenty of 
influence [and] reminders of the past." (Id.) The calls contained "offers" and 
"withdrawals of forgiveness," indications that "Mr. Zaragoza is changing, that he's trying 
to change," and "indication of God or a higher power [and] discussion of the 
relationship." (Id.) 
But the court did not find that Mr. Zaragoza threatened or physically harmed Mrs. 
Zaragoza to keep her away at trial, or secreted her away beyond the State's subpoena 
power. Instead, based on conversations she had with her husband about their relationship 
and his upcoming trial, Mrs. Zaragoza consulted independent counsel through whom she 
invoked her constitutionally protected spousal privilege. (R. 47-52.) Her decision does 
not make Mr. Zaragoza's conduct wrongful, though that is apparently what the trial court 
concluded when it stated that "[t]he fact that she is unavailable is what is the important 
point here." (R. 272:102.) 
Notably, the trial court did not find facts to satisfy the State's proposed test 
because it actually made no findings here. Though the trial court tasked the State with 
preparing findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to forfeiture, the State 
prepared only a summary order, which was never signed. (R. 146,272:109.) That failure 
11 
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alone requires reversal, because it demonstrates the trial court's "failure . . . to address the 
factual questions . . . that were a prerequisite to the admission of [testimony] essential to 
the conviction." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788-89 (Utah 1991). Nor can the 
court's failure be remedied by remanding for findings now. Id. ("To ask the court to 
address the admissibility question now would be to tempt it to reach a post hoc 
rationalization for the admission of the pivotal evidence."). Instead, "[t]he only fair way 
to proceed is to vacate defendant's conviction and remand the matter for retrial." Id. 
The State also advocates for a standard even more relaxed than the holding it 
mines from Poole5 on the basis that three cases cited therein upheld "a finding of 
wrongdoing [without] evidence of threats, violence, or murder." (Resp.Br. 42.) The 
State's position should not be indulged. First, the State quotes Vasquez v. People as 
stating that "'[c]riminal conduct is not required for forfeiture,'" but that quote is dicta 
because the wrongdoing at issue in Vasquez was the murder of the State's witness.6 
Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1104-05 (Colo. 2007) (en banc). The State then relies 
on Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). As discussed in Mr. Zaragoza's 
opening brief, that case involved a defendant who actively hid his wife from law 
enforcement to prevent her from complying with a subpoena, not a claim of privilege or a 
spouse who obtains independent counsel prior to invoking that privilege. Reynolds, 98 
5
 The holding in Poole was that the trial court prematurely made its unavailability 
determination. Poole, 2010 UT 25, ffl[2, 28. The court did not impliedly uphold the trial 
court's forfeiture ruling, as the State suggests, because in light of its holding on 
unavailability, it did "not need to analyze the [wrongdoing] element[]" of the forfeiture 
test. Id. |28. The Supreme Court purported only to give the trial court "guidance" and 
"direction," in the event the forfeiture ruling would be revisited on remand. Id. lfl}2, 21. 
6
 The State quotes from Vasquez: "'wrongdoing is implicit in the procuring of the 
witness's absence.'" (Resp.Br. 42 (quoting Vasquez, 173 P.3d at 1104).) Counsel has 
been unable to find that language in any case cited in Poole. 
12 
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U.S. at 148-50. Finally, the State relies on Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158 
(Mass. 2005). But the court in that case expressly disclaimed any suggestion that 
"informing a witness of the right to remain silent, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, will be sufficient to constitute forfeiture." Id. at 171 n.23. 
That disclaimer carries greater force with respect to a claim of spousal privilege because 
the union meant to be protected by the spousal privilege has, as one of its members, the 
defendant whose confrontation rights are subject to forfeiture. The Poole court's citation 
to those cases does not show that that court would uphold a finding of wrongdoing in the 
circumstances presented here. 
Second, the circumstances presented here are also unique by virtue of the role of 
the spousal privilege. The State misapprehends Mr. Zaragoza's argument regarding the 
spousal privilege. Mr. Zaragoza has argued that although the privilege not to testify rests 
with the witness spouse, the defendant who discusses that privilege with the witness 
spouse should not be deemed to have engaged in wrongdoing. For instance, in light of 
the federal common law spousal privilege, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
a defendant who successfully persuades his spouse to invoke privilege has not met the 
"corrupt persuasion" element of the federal witness tampering statute. Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. U.S., 544 U.S. 696, 703-04 (2005); United States, v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181, 
1189-90 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 171 n.23. The State asserts that 
some federal courts have left open the possibility that a defendant who coerces his spouse 
into invoking privilege might be guilty of witness tampering. (Resp. Br. 41 & n.2.) But 
the State cites no case holding that a defendant forfeits his confrontation clause rights by 
discussing his case with his spouse in light of a constitutional spousal privilege. Instead, 
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rather than responding to Mr. Zaragoza's arguments regarding spousal privilege, the State 
argues that the privilege did not require exclusion of recorded phone calls during the 
forfeiture hearing. (Resp.Br. 43-50.) 
The State's arguments—focused as they are on whether the phone calls should 
have been played at the forfeiture hearing—do not address the constitutional nature of the 
spousal privilege and the confrontation clause. Nor do the State's arguments address the 
role of a constitutional privilege in relation to the forfeiture doctrine. The purpose behind 
the doctrine is to "strike[] an appropriate balance between protecting the integrity of the 
criminal process . . . and the right [to cross-examination] guaranteed by article I, section 
12 of the Utah Constitution." Poole, 201 OUT 25, |20. The confrontation clause 
guarantees that a defendant may not be convicted without the opportunity to cross-
examine those giving testimonial statements against him. Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 68 (2004). The spousal privilege prohibits the State from compelling one spouse 
to testify against the other. State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, 1J20, 218 P.3d 590. In 
both instances, the framers of the Utah Constitution elevated certain individual rights 
above the State's interest. Further, the purpose of the spousal privilege "is to foster the 
harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship"—a purpose that cannot be fulfilled if 
spouses may not discuss whether the privilege should be invoked. Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). When the court makes an "'essentially equitable'" forfeiture 
determination, it should accommodate the role of the spousal privilege—and the need for 
discussions about that privilege—in balancing the competing interests at hand. See 
Poole, 2010 UT 25, TflO (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62). The court may not do what 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the trial court did here: conclude that "offers of forgiveness" and "reminders of the past," 
were wrongful because they led to Mrs. Zaragoza exercising her privilege. (R. 272:103.) 
Because the State misapprehends Mr. Zaragoza's arguments, its brief contains no 
arguments responsive to Mr. Zaragoza's arguments related to the spousal privilege. The 
trial court's forfeiture ruling deemed Mr. Zaragoza's conduct wrongful without adequate 
consideration for the role of that privilege. 
B. Mrs. Zaragoza's Decision to Testify After the Confrontation Clause 
Violation Was Complete Did Not Cure That Violation 
The trial court's error in admitting Mrs. Zaragoza's out-of-court statements was 
not cured by Mrs. Zaragoza testifying. The right to cross-examine a witness cannot be 
distorted to place on the defendant the burden to call a witness to avoid a constitutional 
violation. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009), is instructive. 
There, the court concluded that a defendant's confrontation rights are violated when a 
state introduces certificates of analysis as evidence to show that a substance the defendant 
possessed was examined and found to contain an illicit substance. Id. at 2530. The state 
argued that, even if the certificates attested to by a non-testifying witness constituted 
testimonial hearsay, the defendant's confrontation rights were not violated because the 
defendant could have called the attesting analysts to the stand. Id. at 2540. The court 
rejected the state's attempt to "[c]onvert[] the prosecution's duty under the Confrontation 
Clause into the defendant's privilege," because it would "shift[] the consequences of 
adverse-witness no-shows from the State to the accused." Id The court stated "the 
Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on 
the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court." Id. (emphasis added). 
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Here, the forfeiture ruling violated Mr. Zaragoza's confrontation clause rights by 
permitting the State to rely on out-of-court testimonial statements instead of requiring it 
to produce the testifying witness against Mr. Zaragoza. Consistent with Melendez-Diaz, 
that violation was not cured when Mrs. Zaragoza took the witness stand to mitigate the 
harmful effects of the court's forfeiture ruling. United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.3d 346, 
358-59 (10th Cir. 1978) (the court must "ponder[] all that happened without stripping the 
erroneous action from the whole" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Further, even if Mrs. Zaragoza's trial testimony cured the constitutional violation, 
her decision to testify did not retroactively make admissible the State's hearsay evidence. 
Mr. Zaragoza was entitled to a trial free from inadmissible hearsay. West Valley City v. 
Hutto, 2000 UT App 188,1}25, 5 P.3d 1. The statements attributed to Mrs. Zaragoza by 
the State's witnesses were hearsay because they are out-of-court statements offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Utah R. Evid. 801. Yet the trial court foreclosed 
any hearsay objection, by concluding that Mr. Zaragoza forfeited the right to any hearsay 
objections along with his confrontation clause rights. (R. 272:105.) Because the trial 
court collapsed the two inquiries, its forfeiture ruling was also an evidentiary error that 
pervaded the whole trial. State v. Byrd, 967 A.2d 285, 297-98 (N.J. 2009) (absent 
controlling evidentiary rule, defendant who forfeits confrontation right does not forfeit 
hearsay objections); Vasquez, 173 P.3d at 1106 ("The fact that the defendant has 
forfeited his confrontation rights . . . does not render the evidence reliable"). And the 
statements were not admissible under any hearsay exception. Under rule 801(d)(1), for a 
7
 Due to the forfeiture ruling, the State did not have to justify the admissibility of the 
hearsay. That was harmful error. Mrs. Zaragoza's statements to officers regarding what 
happened in the hotel room were not present sense impressions or excited utterances, as 
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witness's prior inconsistent statements to be admissible, the defendant must "testif[y] at 
the trial," something Mrs. Zaragoza would not have done. The trial court's evidentiary 
error was not cured by Mrs. Zaragoza's testifying. 
III. This Court is Not Barred From Reaching Mr. Zaragoza's Claims 
The court should reach the merits of Mr. Zaragoza's claims. As mentioned at the 
outset of this brief, the State proposes various reasons why this court should not decide 
the issues before it. The State argues that both the jury instruction claim and the spousal 
privilege arguments are unpreserved, even though the State acknowledges the jury 
instruction was proposed below and the trial court considered and rejected the privilege 
arguments in making its forfeiture ruling. Then, as to the confrontation clause claim, the 
State argues that the court should decline to review the trial court's decision because Mr. 
Zaragoza failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, even though 
the court entered no findings of fact. Finally, the State argues that Mr. Zaragoza failed to 
brief his confrontation clause claim adequately, finding fault in Mr. Zaragoza citing to the 
same portions of the record on which the State relies. Here, Mr. Zaragoza will show that 
the events in question had already concluded by the time officers arrived. Utah R. Evid. 
803(1) to 803(2). Nor were they statements regarding then existing mental, emotional, or 
physical conditions, as "statements] of memory . . . offered to prove the fact 
remembered" are expressly excluded from that exception. Utah R. Evid. 803(3). The 
statements to police officers were not "for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment," 
nor were they limited to "describing medical history." Utah R. Evid. 803(4). Nor were 
Mrs. Zaragoza's statements "records," "learned treatises," "statements in documents," 
"judgments," or statements of "reputation." Utah R. Evid. 803(5) to 803(23). Finally, 
even though Mrs. Zaragoza was unavailable under rule 804, the statements do not satisfy 
the exceptions for "former testimony," because the statements were not made at a prior 
proceeding under oath, were not a "statement under belief of impending death," a 
"statement against interest," or a "statement of personal or family history." Utah R. Evid. 
804(b). Nor, given the inconsistencies among the statements attributed to Mrs. Zaragoza, 
could they be said to exhibit independent guarantees of trustworthiness, such that the 
residual hearsay exception applies. Utah R. Evid. 807. 
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this court can, and should, resolve the merits of this dispute because: (i) his claims are 
preserved; (ii) the marshaling requirement does not apply here; and (iii) Mr. Zaragoza's 
brief adequately directed this court to the record and relevant legal authority. 
A. Mr. Zaragoza's Claims Are Preserved 
Mr. Zaragoza's jury instruction claim and his arguments regarding the spousal 
privilege are preserved. A party preserves an issue by raising an error "to a level of 
consciousness" sufficient to give the trial court "an adequate opportunity to address it." 
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ^ |16, 164 P.3d 397 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The preservation requirement is founded on two policies: requiring that issues be raised 
below (i) gives the trial court the opportunity to address and correct errors, and (ii) 
prevents a defendant from strategically foregoing an objection, "and then, if that strategy 
fails, . . . claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, Tfl 1, 10 P.3d 346 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, Mr. Zaragoza will 
separately address preservation of the jury instruction claim and the spousal privilege 
arguments. 
1. Mr. Zaragoza Preserved His Jury Instruction Claim By 
Proposing the Instruction He Claims Should Have Been Given 
Mr. Zaragoza preserved the jury instruction issue by proposing an instruction that 
would have explained to the jury the lesser-included relationship between aggravated 
kidnapping and aggravated assault. Proposing precisely the instruction that Mr. Zaragoza 
argues on appeal should have been given gave the trial court an opportunity to address 
that issue, which the trial court did. (R. 252:219.) Mr. Zaragoza did not strategically 
forego an objection to enhance his odds at trial. 
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The State implies that Mr. Zaragoza did not preserve his lesser-included-offense 
argument because the proposed instruction does not contain the words 'lesser-included.' 
That argument does not account for the other language of the instruction or the sequence 
of events below. Although trial counsel argued merger, the trial court rejected that 
argument, concluding these offenses can never merge because "there is no detention that 
is necessarily incidental to the crime of aggravated assault." (R. 252:218.) Trial counsel 
then made clear that he was proposing a jury instruction in response to "the Court's 
ruling that the case is not appropriately merged." (R. 252:219.) That is the context for 
trial counsel's proposal to instruct the jury that it could not "find the defendant guilty of 
both a kidnapping charge and an assault charge unless [the jury] find[s] beyond a 
reasonable doubt that any detention . . . was independent of and not merely incidental to 
any assault of Ms. Zaragoza." (Id.) And through that language, the proposed instruction 
raises the central issue with respect to lesser-included offenses—whether the prosecution 
proved all the elements of the greater crime or only a less severe alternative. 
The State assumes its preservation challenge will be successful, and so argues in 
the context of plain error that Mr. Zaragoza has not shown the jury instruction error was 
obvious, which is not the standard because the issue was preserved. The State claims that 
the opening brief "provides no analysis of the relevant statutes to support" the proposition 
that there is overlap between the crimes of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. 
(Resp.Br. 14.) The State also contends that Mr. Zaragoza did not show that the evidence 
gave the jury a rational basis for acquitting of the kidnapping charge and convicting of 
the assault charge. (Resp.Br. 14.) The State is incorrect because the discussion above— 
explaining how the testimony of Officer Smalley and Mrs. Zaragoza provided a rational 
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basis for convicting of only the aggravated assault charge—was set forth on pages 11-12 
and 18-19 of Mr. Zaragoza's opening brief. Mr. Zaragoza also showed that the element 
of substantial detention separates the offenses and that, to convict, the jury was required 
to find "that Mrs. Zaragoza was detained substantially longer than necessary to commit 
the assault." (Op.Br. 17.) Mr. Zaragoza also cited to controlling precedent, State v. 
Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 589-90 (Utah 1984), establishing that aggravated kidnapping and 
assault have the overlap in elements that supports instructing the jury on the relationship 
between the two offenses. (Op.Br. 15.) Were the court to reach the issue in the context 
o 
of plain error—which is unnecessary because the issue is preserved —the failure to 
follow controlling precedent is a sufficiently obvious error to warrant reversal. 
2. Mr. Zaragoza Preserved His Arguments Regarding the Spousal 
Privilege By Raising Them During the Forfeiture Hearing 
With respect to how the spousal privilege impacts the forfeiture analysis, the issue 
is preserved because trial counsel raised the argument and the trial court expressly 
considered the issue in making its forfeiture ruling. Early in the forfeiture hearing, trial 
counsel stated "I think the Court's hit it on the head, and I think that there's a reason for 
espousal [sic] privilege. It's a different relationship than a relationship with any, any 
other person.... And society has a certain interest in maintaining the relationship 
between man and wife." (R. 272:12-13.) Trial counsel later argued that "the whole 
reason for the marital privilege is to preserve marriages." (R. 272:28.) Those statements 
brought the issue to the trial court's attention and gave the court a chance to consider Mr. 
8
 Though unnecessary, this court reserves the right to reach an issue under the plain error 
doctrine, if "proper disposition" of the case requires it, regardless of how or when it is 
raised. Romrell v. Zions First Nat. Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980). 
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Zaragoza's arguments. And the court did consider the privilege arguments, stating that 
"in a situation like this where the . . . spouse has invoked the marital privilege, the whole 
purpose—and we talked a lot about this . . . is to protect the marital institution." (R. 
272:103-04.); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991) (even where counsel 
does not raise an issue, the trial court's reaching the issue sua sponte preserves the issue 
for review). The State is aware that the trial court considered the spousal privilege 
arguments in deciding the forfeiture issue—the State cites this discussion in its brief. 
(Resp.Br. 33.) Mr. Zaragoza preserved his spousal privilege arguments. 
B. The Marshaling Requirement Does Not Apply Here Because The 
District Court Made No Findings 
Mr. Zaragoza has no duty to marshal the evidence because there are no factual 
findings to challenge or to marshal evidence to support. In addition, under Poole, 
forfeiture rulings are questions of law: "the district court's decision to admit testimony 
that may implicate the confrontation clause is . . . a question of law reviewed for 
correctness." Poole, 2010 UT 25, | 8 . The State does not address the legal nature of Mr. 
Zaragoza's confrontation clause claim, asserting instead that "no standard of review 
applies." (Resp.Br. 2.) Even if there were findings of fact here, the marshaling 
requirement would not impact this court's ability to address whether the trial court 
applied the proper legal standard—i.e., finding the pressure, manipulation, and threats 
that would support a finding of wrongdoing. 
Moreover, there are no fact findings with respect to the forfeiture ruling.9 (R. 
156.) Even if the State were correct that Mr. Zaragoza had a duty to marshal evidence, 
9
 Nor would the failure to marshal be a bar to this court's considering the issue. This 
court always retains discretion to determine if the trial court's decision has adequate 
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the consequence would be for this court to "accept the trial court's findings of fact as 
valid" and then "review the trial court's ultimate legal conclusions." Kimball v. Kimball 
2009 UT App 233,1J22, 217 P.3d 733. But there are no findings for this court to accept. 
As discussed, the court never signed the summary order prepared by the State, which 
order only indicates that "by a preponderance of the evidence [the court finds] that the 
Defendant engaged in witness tampering [that procured] the unavailability of Christine 
Zaragoza As a result, the Defendant has forfeited his right to confront [her]." (R. 
156.) The question at hand is whether the legal standard applied by the trial court 
satisfies the constitutional requirements articulated in Poole. 
To the extent that answering that question requires reference to findings of fact, 
the trial court's failure to enter such findings is itself grounds for reversal. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 789. The State is correct when it states that "the forfeiture doctrine 'requires a 
case-specific and careful analysis of the specific acts of the defendant.'" (Resp.Br. 38 
(quoting Poole, 2010 UT 25, Tf25).) Though the State suggests that quote demonstrates a 
need to marshal, the quote is directed to district courts and the evidentiary standard they 
should apply when extinguishing confrontation rights. Poole, 2010 UT 25, ^22-26. In 
that passage, the court also cautioned against what apparently occurred here: concluding 
"that a defendant's right to confrontation is easily forfeited" and "summarily dispos[ing]" 
of a "weighty matter." Id. ^|25. The marshaling requirement does not apply here, and is 
certainly not a bar to this court reaching the merits. 
factual support. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, ^ 20, 164 P.3d 384. 
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C. Mr. Zaragoza Adequately Briefed His Claims 
Mr. Zaragoza's opening brief is not inadequate. A brief is adequate under rule 
24(a)(9), "where the 'brief as a whole [is] supported by the record and the [appellant 
makes] good faith arguments that [are] adequately supported by case law.'" Cabaness v. 
Thomas. 2010 UT 23, | 2 1 , 232 P.3d 486 (quoting Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 
98,1fl9, 104 P.3d 1208). Mr. Zaragoza's opening brief satisfies that standard. There he 
discusses the conclusion reached by the trial court—i.e., Mr. Zaragoza forfeited his 
confrontation rights through phone calls to his wife, which the court concluded 
constituted witness tampering. (Op.Br. 3-5, 31.) To provide this court with meaningful 
analysis in the relative absence of Utah jurisprudence, Mr. Zaragoza contrasts that 
reasoning with the reasoning employed by courts considering forfeiture issues in other 
jurisdictions and with the standards set forth in Poole. (Id. 13-14, 20-29). That analysis 
addresses what sort of conduct traditionally has been held to constitute wrongdoing and 
how the trial court's result conflicts with the historical application of the doctrine and the 
standards articulated in Poole. (Id.) In setting forth that analysis, Mr. Zaragoza directs 
this court, with citation, to relevant cases, the forfeiture hearing transcript, and other 
portions of the record on which he relies. (Id.) That briefing is adequate. 
The State's arguments regarding inadequacy focus on two alleged shortcomings. 
First, the State contends that Mr. Zaragoza "fail[ed] to identify the test the [trial] court 
applied or the full breadth of the court's ruling." (Resp.Br. 37.) To the contrary, Mr. 
Zaragoza's opening brief directs the court to the trial court's oral ruling on forfeiture. 
(Op.Br. 4-5.) Notably, the State's response brief directs the court to the same oral ruling 
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to identify the test the trial court applied. (Resp.Br. 33.) That similarity is unsurprising 
since no written order expounds on that oral ruling. Mr. Zaragoza directed this court to 
the substance of the trial court ruling by citing to the same portions of the record on 
which the State relies. (Op.Br. 3-5.)n 
Second, the State claims that Mr. Zaragoza's argument "rests entirely on 
conclusory statements for which he provides no record support." (Resp.Br. 38.) But the 
statements the State identifies are from the introductory paragraphs of Mr. Zaragoza's 
forfeiture discussion or the conclusion of a subsection. (Op.Br. 21-22, 32.) Between the 
introduction and the conclusion are pages of analysis, supported by citation, that the State 
does not acknowledge. (Id. 30-32.) The opening brief is adequate, and the State provides 
no reason for disregarding the substance of Mr. Zaragoza's appeal. 
Finally, the State suggests that this court need not address Mr. Zaragoza's claim 
regarding the standard the trial court employed because the court employed a higher 
standard. (Resp.Br. 41.) The State quotes from the first few moments of the forfeiture 
hearing, where the trial court indicated that it would not find forfeiture unless the State 
"presented] evidence 'other than the suggestion' by Defendant that Christine 'do 
The State invites the court to compare page four of the opening brief with section II. A. 
of the State's response. (Resp.Br. 37.) But section II.A of the State's response contains 
no reference to the court's ruling. The State apparently meant to refer to its section II.B. 
11
 Consider the State's invitation to compare its brief with Mr. Zaragoza's opening brief 
to contrast the quality. (Resp.Br. 37.) In section II.B of its brief, the State directs the 
court to the very same passages referred to or quoted in Mr. Zaragoza's opening brief, 
including the oral ruling explaining why the trial court found wrongdoing. (Compare 
Resp.Br. 33 with Op.Br. 4-5.) The State also quotes the trial court's conclusions 
regarding the spousal privilege, referenced on page 30 of Mr. Zaragoza's opening brief. 
As to that reference, Mr. Zaragoza cited to a case the trial court quoted in issuing its 
ruling, instead of the page from the hearing transcript, R. 272:104, the same page from 
which the State quotes and which is cited elsewhere in the opening brief. (Op.Br. 3-5.) 
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something that she is legally entitled to do,'" and required proof of'"emotional 
manipulation,' or 'a discussion between the two of them, an understanding, a recognition 
that her invoking the privilege is going to render the State's case null.'" (Id (quoting R. 
272:16-17,37).) 
Those preliminary statements do not reflect the standard the trial court actually 
applied. Though the trial court initially indicated that it would apply a strict forfeiture 
standard, it later returned from a short recess and announced that "[w]hen we started this 
hearing, I indicated that it was my understanding . . . [that] Ms. Zaragoza's decision to 
invoke the marital privilege must have been wrongfully brought to bear by Mr. 
Zaragoza." (R. 272:100-02.) The court then stated "I have changed my mind to the 
extent that I don't believe that . . . the State has to prove that the wrongful intent to 
pressure, to bribe, to encourage Ms. Zaragoza not to testify is linked to her indication of 
the marital privilege." (Id. (emphasis added).) The court then concluded, "[t]he fact that 
she is unavailable is what is the important point here." (Id.) As Mr. Zaragoza argued in 
his opening brief, the trial court conflated wrongdoing and intended unavailability, even 
unavailability resulting from exercising a constitutional privilege. (Op.Br. 23-24.) Mr. 
Zaragoza's brief was not inadequate. It raised and adequately addressed issues that this 
court should now resolve. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Zaragoza respectfully requests that the court 
reverse Mr. Zaragoza's conviction and remand for a new trial. 
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